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WASHINGTONAND LEE LA WRE VIEW
XI. PATENT, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK LAW
A. Right to Jury Trial Under Copyright Act's
Statutory Damage Provision
The seventh amendment to the United States Constitution provides
a right to a jury trial in legal actions.' Equitable actions, however, are
not subject to the seventh amendment's guarantee of a jury trial.2 In
1974, the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Loether3 established a test for
determining whether the seventh amendment's right to a jury trial at-
tached to statutorily created causes of action.4 Under the Curtis test, a
party is entitled to a jury trial if his cause of action is created by a
federal statute that codifies rights and remedies traditionally enforce-
able at common law.5 The action must be both traditionally enforceable
and legal in nature."
Federal courts are split on *the issue whether the Copyright Act of
19767 contains a constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial in actions
where the plaintiff claiming copyright infringement seeks statutory, but
not actual damages The disagreement arises from ambiguous language
U.S. CONST. amend VII. The seventh amendment provides that "[iln suits at common
law.., the right of trial by jury shall be preserved..." Id.; see Curtis V. Loether, 415 U.S.
189, 195 (1974). Historically, suits at common law were those actions which were legal, as op-
posed to equitable, in nature. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). Equitable actions,
however, were recognized only in the courts of equity which had discretion to fashion any
remedy necessary to achieve a fair settlement. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500, 507 (1959) (equity jurisdiction provides remedy where legal remedies inadequate).
The framers of the seventh amendment intended the amendment to apply not only to causes
of action specifically recognized at common law, but also to suits enforcing rights of a legal
nature rather than suits enforcing equitable rights and seeking equitable remedies. Parsons
v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).
The Supreme Court has interpreted the seventh amendment to provide a right to a
jury trial in actions to enforce statutory legal rights, even if the statutory action at issue did
not exist at common law when the seventh amendment was adopted in 1791. See Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193-95 (1974).
Classification of federal civil actions as legal or equitable suits, however, became difficult
with the merger of law and equity under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because
under the Rules, federal courts now hear both legal and equitable claims together in one
action. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 302, 304 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
2 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
3 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
4 See id. at 194. The plaintiff in Curtis v. Loether filed a claim seeking injunctive
relief, actual damages and punitive-damages for violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
415 U.S. 189, 189-90 (1974); see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1976). The Supreme Court held that an
action under the Act carried a right to a jury trial because the claim sounded in tort and en-
forced legal rights. 415 U.S. at 195. The Court found that the right to a jury trial flows from
the legal nature of the right to damages created by the Civil Rights Act. Id.
' Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974).
, Id. at 195.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976).
8 See McMahon v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Mo. 1980) (courts
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in the Copyright Act and conflicting characterizations of the statutory
damage remedy under the Copyright Act' as either legal or equitable.1"
The Copyright Act's statutory damage provision states that the copy-
right owner may recover between $250.00 and $10,000.00 in statutory
damages "as the court considers just.""u The Fourth Circuit, in Gnossos
Music v. Mitke, Inc.,"2 found that the language of the Copyright Act
(Act) did not provide a right to a jury trial but held that the seventh
amendment provided the right to a jury trial in an action seeking
statutory damages under the Act. 3
In Gnossos, six copyright owners brought suit against Mitken, Inc.
and Jerry Mitchell, Mitken's principle stockholder, alleging five
unauthorized public performances of copyrighted musical works." One of
the six copyright owners and two additional copyright owners filed a
separate suit against the same defendants alleging two similar copyright
infringements." The defendants demanded a jury trial in both suits."
The plaintiffs in each suit moved to strike the defendant's jury trial de-
mand and waived any recovery above the $250.00 minimum statutory
damages which section 504(c) of the Copyright Act provides.1 7 The
district court consolidated the two suits, denied the defendants' jury
trial request, and entered judgment for the plaintiffs on five copyright
infringement counts. s The district court permanently enjoined the
defendant's performance of the copyrighted musical compositions and
dispute whether right to jury trial exists in copyright infringement suits seeking statutory
damages). Compare Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 1952) (right to jury trial
exists under Copyright Act's statutory damage provision) and Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Moor-Law, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. 487, 488 (D. Del. 1978) (same) with Chappell & Co. v. Palermo
Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 81-80 (1st Cir. 195.7) (no right to jury trial exists under Copyright
Act's statutory damage provision) and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Dici Naz Velleggia, Inc., 490
F. Supp. 1342, 1343 (D. Md. 1980) (same).
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1976). The Copyright Act of 1976 provides that the infringing
party is liable either for actual damages and additional profits resulting from the infringe-
ment, or for statutory damages. Id.
"0 See Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117, 119, 120 (4th Cir. 1981) (statutory
damage action under Copyright Act is legal in nature). But see Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Frith, 645 F.2d 6, 7 (5th Cir. 1981) (statutory damage action under Copyright Act is
equitable).
"' 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976).
1 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981).
13 Id. at 119, 120.
" Id. at 118.
1 Id.; Brief for Appellant at 3, Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir.
1981).
653 F.2d at 118.
Id. The plaintiffs in Gnossos stipulated that they would not offer proof of actual
damages. Id. In waiving damages in excess of the statutory minimum of $250.00, the plain-
tiffs sought to remove the damage issue from the case and thereby relinquished the
possibility of a larger recovery. See Brief for Appellee at 20, Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc.,
653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981); note 8 supra.
" 653 F.2d at 118.
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ordered payment of $250.00 for each infringement.19 Mitken appealed to
the Fourth Circuit.
0
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, Mitken challenged the district
court's order denying its motion for a jury trial.21 The Fourth Circuit
followed Supreme Court precedent that required construction of a
statute before reaching questions of constitutional interpretation.2
Thus, the Fourth Circuit considered first whether the Copyright Act's
language indicated a congressional intent to provide a jury trial right,
before considering seventh amendment requirements. 23
In construing the damage provision of the Copyright Act,' the
Gnossos court rejected the appellee's argument that the phrase, "as the
court considers just," compelled an equitable role for a judge rather than
a jury.2 Rejecting the holdings of two other circuits,2 the Fourth Circuit
held that the statutory use of "court" could refer to a jury rather than a
judge.' The Gnossos court found, however, that the Act's use of "court"
was ambiguous and not indicative of any congressional intent to man-
date either bench or jury trials in copyright infringement actions seek-
ing statutory damages.'
11 Id. In addition to $250.00 in statutory damages for each copyright infringement, the
Gnossos district court awarded the plaintiffs costs, including $1250.00 in attorney's fees. Id.
go Id.
21 Id.
22 See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978) (courts must attempt statutory con-
struction before resorting to constitutional interpretation); Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189,
192 n.6 (1974) (same). See also Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 224 n.23 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 934 (1978) (courts must attempt statutory construction before
reaching constitutional question).
2 653 F.2d at 118-19.
24 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976).
1 653 F.2d at 119; see text accompanying note 11 supra.
See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1957). In Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that
the issue of statutory damaged under the former Copyright Act, Ch. 220, 35 Stat. 1075
(1909), was addressed to the court rather than jury. 562 F.2d at 1177. In Chappell & Co. v.
Palermo Cafe Co., the First Circuit similarly interpreted the former Copyright Act's
statutory damage provision and found no statutory right to a jury trial in statutory damage
claims. 249 F.2d at 80-81.
7 653 F.2d at 119 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 189-90 (1974) (finding
statutory construction of "court" futile where prior seventh amendment decisions require
interpretation mandating jury trial); Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 225 n.26 (4th
Cir. 1978) (finding use of "court" indeterminative on question of statutory right to jury
trial)).
653 F.2d at 119. In finding the language of the Copyright Act ambiguous, the
Gnossos court stressed that the Act's language arguably supports an interpretation requir-
ing a jury trial but failed to provide any explanation. Id. The Gnossos court refused to base
its holding on a statutory interpretation which required a jury trial. Id. Other courts also
have struggled with interpretation of the language of the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Chappell
& Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 80 (1st Cir. 1957) (former statute gave no right to
jury trial); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 302, 304 (N.D. Ind. 1979)
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After holding that the statutory language of the Copyright Act did
not specifically require a jury trial, the Gnossos court considered
whether the seventh amendment provided Mitken with the right to a
jury trial.9 The Gnossos court recognized that the seventh amendment
provided a jury trial only on legal, as opposed to equitable, issues." The
Gnossos court asserted that under the Supreme Court's decision in Cur-
tis v. Loether,' the seventh amendment requires a jury trial of right if
the relevant statute creates rights and remedies analogous to rights and
remedies traditionally enforceable in actions at common law.2
To determine whether the rule of Curtis required. jury trials in ac-
tions for statutory damages under the Copyright Act, the Gnossos court
applied a two-part test which the Fourth Circuit fashioned in Barber v.
Kimbrell's, Inc.' Under the Barber test, the court first must determine
whether the rights and duties created by the statute are analogous to
traditionally enforced legal rights." The court must then determine
whether the remedy sought is legal or equitable in nature3 5 If the
statutory right is analogous to traditionally enforced legal rights and the
remedy sought is legal in nature, the Barber test finds a right to a jury
trial under the seventh amendment."
The Gnossos court found that the right of action for copyright in-
fringement under the Act was analogous to the traditionally enforced
legal right of action for tortious interference with a property right." The
("court" in former version of Copyright Act, meant "judge"); Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier
Cafe, Inc., 13 F.RD. 321, 323 (D. Mass. 1952) (interpreting former Copyright Act to require
right to jury trial).
1 653 F.2d at 119-20. To determine the requirements of the seventh amendment, the
Gnossos court analyzed several Supreme Court cases which clarified the proper interpreta-
tion and scope of the amendment. Id. The Fourth Circuit found that Curtis v. Loether, 415
U.S. 189 (1974) required that a suit to enforce statutory rights be characterized under the
seventh amendment's legal/equitable framework to determine whether the amendment
guaranteed a jury trial in such a suit. 653 F.2d at 119-20.
3 653 F.2d at 120; see note 1 supra.
s' 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
653 F.2d at 120.
3Id. See Barber v. Kimbrelrs, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 225 (4th Cir. 1978). In Barber v. Kim-
brell's, Inc., the Fourth Circuit considered whether the Truth in Lending Act provided a
right to a jury trial under the Act's statutory damage provision. 577 F.2d at 225; see 15
U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (1976). The Barber court first analogized the statutorily created cause
of action to traditional common law actions for tort. 577 F.2d at 225. The court characterized
the statute as creating a new statutory duty and authorizing statutory damages analogous
to punitive damages. Id. Punitive damages traditionally are a form of legal relief. Id.
Because a legal form of relief remedied a breach of the Truth in Lending Act's newly
created duty, the Fourth Circuit held that an action under the Act carried the seventh
amendment guarantee of a right to a jury trial. Id. at 225-26.
" Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 225 (4th Cir. 1978).
3 Id.
3 See id.
See 653 F.2d 117, 120 (4th Cir. 1981). The Gnossos court found the Second Circuit's
decisions in Screen Gems-Columbia Music v. Metlis & Lebow Corp. and Ted Browne Music
1982]
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court further found that the Act's statutory damage remedy was legal in
nature because the minimum statutory damage remedy was analogous
to the ancient legal remedy for recovery of an unpaid debt. Addition-
ally, the court found that the limited range of the statutory damages did
not change the nature of the remedy.3 9 Having concluded that the Act's
rights and remedies satisfied both prongs of the Barber test, the
Gnossos court held that the seventh amendment required a jury trial of
right in actions seeking statutory damages under the Act."0 The Fourth
Circuit therefore reversed and remanded Gnossos to the district court
for a jury trial.4
1
The Gnossos court's statutory construction of the Copyright Act and
application of the seventh amendment to the Act's statutory damage
provision find support in Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent."
In Curtis v. Loether,3 the Supreme Court found that use of the phrase,
"the court may grant as relief," in the Civil Rights Act of 1968" did not
conclusively envision either a judge sitting in equity, or a judge and jury
sitting at law.'5 In Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc.,4 the Fourth Circuit found
that the Truth in Lending Act's use of the word "court"'47 did not specifical-
ly contemplate "judge" or "jury.'' 4'Thus, the Curtis and Barber decisions
support the Gnossos court's conclusion that the Copyright Act's phrase,
Co. v. Fowler supportive of the analogy between copyright infringement actions and tor-
tious interference with property rights. Id.; see Screen Gems-Columbia Music v. Metlis &
Lebow Corp., 453 F.2d 552, 554 (2d Cir. 1972); Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 F. 751,
754 (2d Cir. 1923). Both Second Circuit cases, however, used the tort analogy only for pur-
poses fo determining whether the rule of joint and several liability extended to a copyright
infringement action. See Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Metlis & Lebow Corp., 453
F.2d 552, 554 (2d Cir. 1972); Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 F. 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1923).
The analogy should extend also to the characterization of the copyright infringement action
as legal. See Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d at 120.
1 653 F.2d at 120.
3 Id.
'0 Id. at 121. The Gnossos court concluded that even if the plaintiff sought both legal
and equitable relief in a copyright infringement claim, the seventh amendment right to jury
trial on the legal issues would remain unaffected. Id. at 120.
1 Id. at 121.
42 See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192, 195-96 (1974); Barber v. Kimbrell's,
Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 225 (4th Cir. 1978).
11 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
- 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976).
" Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192, 198 (1974). In Curtis v. Loether, the Supreme
Court found the language of the fair housing provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1968 plain-
ly indeterminative. Id. at 192. The Court held that the seventh amendment provided a right
to jury trial because the fair housing provisions enforced legal rights and offered legal
remedies. Id. at 195-96; see 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976).
46 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978).
47 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1976).
" Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 224 n.23, 225 n.26 (4th Cir. 1978). See also
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. 487, 488 (D, Del. 1978) (language of
copyright infringement statute alone indeterminative of jury trial right).
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"as the court considers just," did not provide a statutory right to a jury
trial.
Several courts construing statutory language similar to that of the
Copyright Act of 1976 have found use of "court" to imply a trial without
a jury. 9 The cases that imply a trial without a jury are distinguishable
from Gnossos. Each decision relied on language of the Copyright Act of
1909 not contained in the present Copyright Act to interpret "court."50
The Copyright Act of 1909 expressly authorized the "court" to exercise
"discretion" in fixing statutory damages." Courts construing the 1909
Copyright Act focused on the word "discretion" and concluded that
"discretion" implied an equitable role for the court.2 Congress removed
the "discretion" language from the 1976 Copyright Act at issue in
Gnossos.w The Gnossos court, therefore, properly found cases inter-
preting the 1909 Act no obstacle to its determination that the 1976 Act
was ambiguous on the right to jury trial issue.4
After finding no answer to the jury trial question in statutory con-
struction of the Copyright Act, the Gnossos court correctly held the
seventh amendment guarantee of a right to jury trial applicable to
statutory damage actions under the Act. 5 The Curtis and Barber deci-
sions support the Gnossos court's holding." In Curtis and Barber, the
Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit respectively held that statutorily
created actions encompassed the seventh amendment guarantee when
the actions enforced rights analogous to traditionally enforced legal
rights and sought remedies legal in nature.
57
The Gnossos court properly used the test fashioned in Barber for
determining whether the requirements of Curtis for finding a jury trial
right were satisfied. A copyright infringement action seeking statutory
" See Sid and Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977) (supplemental opinion) (statutory damage provisions directed to
court, not jury); Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77,82 (1st Cir. 1957) (language
of Copyright Act of 1909 implies an equitable action and thus does not include right to jury
trial); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 302, 306 (NJ). Ind. 1979)
(former Copyright Act implies no right to jury trial). Compare 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976) with
Copyright Act, Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)..
ISee Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1177 (9th Cir. 1977) (construing Copyright Act, Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)); Chappell
& Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 82 (1st Cir. 1957) (same); Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
Papa John's, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 302, 306 (NJD. Ind. 1979) (same); note 64 infra.
51 Copyright Act, Ch. 320, 35 stat. 1075 (1909).
See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 302, 306 (N.D. Ind. 1979)
(finding that "discretion" implies equitable role for court).
u See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1976).
" 653 F.2d at 119.
See id. at 120-21.
See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-96 (1974); Barber v. Kimbrelrs, Inc., 577
F.2d 216, 225 (4th Cir. 1978).
" See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194-96 (1974); Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577
F.2d 216, 225 (4th Cir. 1978).
" See 653 F.2d at 120-21.
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damages satisfies the Barber test's first prong since a copyright in-
fringement claim is analogous to the traditionally enforced legal action
for tortious interference with a property right. 9 The actions are
analogous because both protect a right of ownership.0
The Gnossos court also correctly found that the remedy of statutory
damages under the Copyright Act satisfied the second prong of the
Barber test. As the Gnossos court suggested, an action seeking the
remedy of minimum statutory damages fits the analogy to an action for
recovery of a debt." The Copyright Act creates the debt to compensate
for wrongful use of a copyrighted work.2 While the sum of money due
is not created by private contract, the debt nevertheless is owed
because of the statutory violation."
Some federal courts, including the First Circuit, have characterized
the statutory damage remedy as equitable." Their precedent is uncon-
vincing. The Gnossos court correctly rejected the equity characteriza-
" See id. Cf. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Metlis & Lebow Corp., 453 F.2d
552, 554 (2d Cir. 1972) (copyright infringement analogous to tort); Ted Browne Music Co. v.
Fowler, 290 F. 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1923) (same). See note 37 supra.
' See 653 F.2d at 120. Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Metlis & Lebow Corp.,
453 F.2d 552, 554 (2d Cir. 1972); Ted Browne Music Co. v. Fowler, 290 F. 751, 754 (2d Cir.
1923).
81 653 F.2d at 120; Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528, 530 (D.
Conn. 1977); Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier Cafe, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 321, 323 (D. Mass. 1952). The
Gnossos court's holding that the statutory damage remedy is a form of legal relief finds sup-
port in Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., and Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier Cafe, Inc.
See Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 530; Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier
Cafe, Inc., 13 F.R.D. at 323. Pumpernickel Pub and Cavalier Cafe held that the statutory
damage remedy under the Copyright Act was a legal form of relief, analogous to the com-
mon law action for recovery of a debt upon a statute. See Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel
Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. at 530; Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier Cafe, Inc., 13 F.R.D. at 323.
Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier Cafe, Inc., 13 F.R.]). 321, 322-23 (D. Mass. 1952).
See Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528, 530-31 (D. Conn. 1977)
(statutory damage claim would have been common law action for recovery of debt upon
statute); Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier Cafe, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 321, 323 (D. Mass. 1952) (same).
" See Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe Co., 249 F.2d 77, 81, 82 (1st Cir. 1957) (entire
copyright claim evoking equity jurisdiction or court); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Dici Naz
Velleggia, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1342, 1343 (D. Md. 1980) (statutory damage claim seeks
equitable relief); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 302, 306 (NJ). Ind.
1979) (statutory damage claim traditionally equitable); Cayman Music, Ltd. v.
Reichenberger, 403 F. Supp. 794, 796 (WD. Wis. 1975) (statutory damage claim essentially
equitable). The most convincing argument for an equity characterization of the statutory
damage provision of the Copyright Act analogizes the remedy to the equitable remedies of
restitution and backpay awards under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e) (1976). See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 302, 306 (NJ).
Ind. 1979). The court in Broadcast Musi, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc. contended that restitu-
tion, backpay awards, and the Copyright Act's statutory damage remedy each force the
statutory violator to disgorge money or profit unlawfully gained. See id. at 306. But see text
accompanying note 65 infra. The Papa John's court concluded that the statutory damage
remedy of the Copyright Act was equitable. 201 U.S.P.Q. at 306. Thus, the Papa John's
court found no jury trial right in a copyright infringement action for statutory damages. Id.
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tion of the statutory damage remedy because the remedy flows from a
specific statutory grant, not from the court's general equity power.1
5
Equity power, by contrast, generally operates outside statutory con-
fines."
The Gnossos court's characterization of the Copyright Act's
statutory damage provision as "legal" in nature was appropriate in light
of Congress' intent in enacting the damage provision. Like the legal
remedy of actual damages, the statutory damages created by Congress
are compensatory."' The action for copyright infringement remains one
for compensatory damages with recovery of at least a minimum
amount.8 Congress apparently intended no change in substantive jury
trial rights of parties involved in copyright infringement actions. In-
stead, Congress sought to substitute a statutory remedy where actual
damages are not provable. 9 Congress provided the statutory advantage
to copyright owners because a copyright represents a property interest
difficult to value." By authorizing substitution of statutory damages for
actual damages, Congress simply has limited by statute the range of or-
dinary damages.71 The Gnossos court properly concluded that the
seventh amendment's requirement of the right to a jury trial extended
to actions seeking minimum statutory damages under the Copyright Act
because the statutory -damage provision does not alter fundamentally
the object of the traditionally legal action for actual damages resulting
from a copyright infringement.
1
The Gnossos holding guarantees a right to a jury trial in copyright
infringement actions in the Fourth Circuit where the plaintiff seeks
0 See Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528, 530 (D. Conn. 1977)
(statutory damages authorized by statute, not equity power); Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier
Cafe, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 321, 322 (D. Mass. 1952) (statutory damages do not flow from equity
power). But see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 302, 305-06 (N.D.
Ind. 1979) (statutory damages under Copyright Act flow from court's equitable jurisdiction).
"See Chappell & Co. v. Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528, 530 (D. Conn. 1977)
(statutory damages authorized by virtue of statute, not exercise of general equity powers).
" Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935) (statutory damages to recompense
for injury done copyright owner); Campbell v. Wireback, 269 F. 372, 375 (4th Cir. 1920)
(statutory damages compensate for injuries caused by infringing party); Chappell & Co. v.
Pumpernickel Pub, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 528, 530 (D. Conn. 1977) (statutory damages under
Copyright Act are compensatory); Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier Cafe, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 321,
322-23 (D. Mass. 1952) (statutory damages compensatory and analogous to legal remedy of
treble damages under other statutes).
" See Chappell & Co. v. Cavalier Cafe, Inc., 13 F.R.D. 321, 322 (D. Mass. 1952).
See Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935) (former statute, Copyright Act,
Ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), statutory damage provision adopted for situations where proof
of actual damages difficult); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Papa John's, Inc., 201 U.S.P.Q. 302,305
(N.D. Ind. 1979) (statutory damage remedy created by Congress where actual damages not
provable).
71 See L.A. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Printing Co., 249 U.S. 100, 104, 108 (1919);
Brief for Appellee at 7, 11, Gnossos Music v. Mitken, Inc., 653 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1981).
653 F.2d at 120.
See id. at 121.
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